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An Essay on the Regulation of the
Legal Profession and the Future of
Lawyers' Characters
PATRICK L. BAUDE*
INTRODUCTION
A book on legal ethics, published eighty-two years ago, advised lawyers that
if they must smoke in their offices, at least they should smoke cigars rather
than cigarettes lest their clients believe "lawyers therein have little or no
practice and beguile the time by deadening their senses with cigarette
'dope."" It would not be hard to imagine a contemporary Pplonius advising
a lawyer to confine her chemical recreations to Chardonnay rather than crack
for similar reasons. What would be hard to imagine is that such contemporary
advice would be called "ethics" rather than "marketing."
For this symposium, the editors have invited the faculty to speculate on,
current and future issues in some field in which we work. In this Essay, I
discuss the relationship between the characters of lawyers and the rules
regulating the legal profession. I believe that the way lawyers, regulators, and
scholars think about this issue has been too largely directed by the assumption
that character is a- quality of personality that lawyers forge outside of their
profession. Much of the resulting literature reflects a concern about the
interaction between the lawyer's mental and moral dispositions and the
practice of law, whether for the purpose of judging a lawyer's fitness to
practice or for the purpose of testing the conflict between individual values
and the working lives of the profession. At the same time, the various
regulatory schemes controlling lawyers' behavior are usually examined by
asking how effective they are at controlling the professional's presumed
appetite for unethical conduct.
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. A.B., 1964, The University
of Kansas; J.D., 1966, The University of Kansas; LL.M., 1968, Harvard University. The author is a
member of the Indiana Board of Law Examiners. Of course, the views expressed here are not the views
of that Board. In fact, it is doubtful that the views expressed here are those of the author in his capacity
as a member of the Board.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at a meeting of the Law and Society Association in
May, 1992. The author is grateful to William Simon, Robert Rosen, and Jeffrey Stake for comments on
that version. None of them have seen this version, and they are accordingly blameless.
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There is not a long history of scholarly writing about the body of law
regulating lawyers. Indeed, until the turn of the century, there was not really
such a body of law at all. Not all states were as extreme as Indiana, whose
state constitution protected the right of all voters "of good moral character"
to practice law.2 Throughout the United States, there were low educational
requirements, perfunctory bar examinations, no equivalent of modem
malpractice actions, and little by way of administrative oversight and
discipline. Until twenty years ago, most professors writing on the subject were
reformers rather than scholars, arguing for the creation of regulatory
mechanisms of some sort.
In the last twenty years, there have been two important branches of
scholarly discussion. One branch has analyzed the reforms in historical and
utilitarian terms. Powerful historical accounts have argued that the reforms
earlier in the century were more effective at elevating the income and status
of the profession than at protecting the public. Careful empirical studies,
especially Deborah Rhode's work, which probably defines this genre, have
shown that the current effect of regulation has not been to protect the public
so much as to ensure the spoils of victory to those who control the politics of
the bar.3 The second branch', to which the work of William Simon4 and
David Luban5 is central, has used philosophical methods to explore the
ethical issues of law practice.
6
These intellectual studies support a searching critique of the existing
regime. What is touted as consumer protection-the admission process,
restrictions on unauthorized practice, and judicial oversight-is just a cleverly
disguised guild arrangement. And what is presented as the grand link between
the ethics of the bar and the rule of law is largely a rationalization for an
uncritical ideological embrace of the capitalist ethos. The result is a world in
which the poor have no lawyers, ordinary people have lawyers who are better
at getting business than doing it, and the powerful have lawyers who feel bad
about their effectiveness in augmenting that power.
2. IND. CoNsT. art. VII, § 21 (repealed 1932).
3. E.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 209 (1990); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional
Codes, 59 TEx. L. REv. 689 (1981).
4. William H. Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978
Wis. L. REv. 29.
5. DAVID J. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988).
6. What seems surprisingly missing is a vigorous debate in the law and economics framework. See
generally Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067 (1989).
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To some extent, the real world needs to digest this critique in order to move
on. The United States Supreme Court, for example, has certainly put the force
of federal law on the side of competition rather than restrictive regulation-in,
for example, its advertising7 and residency s decisions. But theory usually
moves faster than practice. The purpose of this Essay is to speculate about the
future of theory.
I believe the unfinished business of theory is to explore the lawyer's
character itself and to recognize that this character has in important ways been
constructed by the regulatory regime. The contemporary mechanisms are not
as crude as they were in 1910-that is, the need to advance the profession's
interest by aligning it with the cigar-smoking class would not be accomplished
by discussing cigarettes in an ethical text. But I think much can be learned
about the contemporary system by looking at it as an effort to construct
lawyers rather than to regulate them. To that end, I explore the character and
fitness requirement for bar admission as a sort of case study of this process.
I. CHARACTER AND FITNESS
For most of the past half-century, nearly all the states have conditioned
admission to the bar upon an applicant's being able to demonstrate that he or
she is of good "character" and "fit" for the practice of law. Among sociolo-
gists and historians of the legal profession, it is a common belief that these
character and fitness restrictions were aimed at keeping the American bar as
Anglo-Saxon as possible. 9 Character and fitness requirements were directed
mainly at southern European men since there were far more effective barriers
to entrance for women and racial minorities. It seems clear that the require-
ments no longer serve their original purpose. Even more striking, it seems
hard to see that the requirements serve any straightforward purpose. The
proportion of applicants denied admission to the bar is minute-best estimated
at one in five hundred.'" Yet the requirement persists in every state and
commands a fairly large amount of time and money."
The obvious explanations for the continuation of character and fitness
inquiries are inadequate to explain the present state of affairs. It appears, I
believe, that the regulation of the bar is made of two almost incompatible
7. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
8. Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988).
9. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA (1976).
10. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE LJ. 491, 516
(1985).
11. See generally id.
1993]
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components. On the one hand is the project of convincing potential customers
that their lawyers will not cheat or otherwise harm them. This is an essential
part of marketing for any business: the contractor is bonded, the drug
smuggler allows on-site inspection, and the lawyer can, at least implicitly,
draw upon the public institutions regulating the bar to vouch for her integrity.
This business of being able to make plausible promises of honesty to potential
customers is fairly mundane and works fairly well. Lawyers who steal from
their clients will get disbarred and client-protection funds might actually
provide some hard cash.
The other project is the Weberian enterprise of justifying the privileges of
lawyers in the political and economic sphere. These privileges are finally
justified by appeal to the idea that lawyers are committed, in the words of the
Preamble to the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, to "cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients,...
to improve the law ... and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of
public service."' 12 This second projecf is by and
large a failure or, at best, an illusion.
The practical success of lawyers is in part dependent on preventing the
public from seeing clearly the difference between these two projects. In that
way, the successes of the first can partly hide the failure of the second, and
public subsidies for the first can be justified by appealing to the second. The
rule, the rhetoric, and the image of "character and fitness" are each a means
of making these two distinct projects appear to be united. But a large group
cannot create illusions of this sort without coming to believe them. And what
a group comes to believe about itself has a way of becoming true.
II. THE PROBLEM
The starting point has to be Deborah Rhode's comprehensive study
published in 1985. She shows convincingly that the character and fitness
standard for admission is administered in an unpredictable way and rests on
unsubstantiated and implausible factual assumptions. Her concluding
summary, that "[a]s currently implemented, the moral fitness requirement both
subverts and trivializes the professional ideals it purports to sustain,"" has
yet to be seriously attacked, yet alone refuted.
Her evidence that the requirement is in part a form of professional
hypocrisy includes two facts which help to define the problem I discuss here.
12. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble (1992).
13. Rhode, supra note 10, at 592.
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First, only a very small number of people are in fact kept from the bar on
grounds of character and fitness-about one in five hundred applicants.'
4
Second, as her survey shows, a significant number of the official screeners in
many states believe that the screening process is of little or no use.'5 Indeed,
browsing through current publications of the National Conference of Bar
Examiners will reveal that Professor Rhode's work is generally accepted as
a valuable scholarly study of the process rather than dismissed as a radical
critique. A recent exchange in Minnesota illustrates the situation. The
Minnesota State Bar Association, following a two-year study, recommended
substantial curtailment of that state's character and fitness screening, relying
in large part on Rhode's article:
The Committee could find no studies which have statistically validated
attorney character and fitness screening. At least one extensive study and
scholarly article by a [visiting] Harvard Law School professor concludes
that such screening as currently done cannot be validated and should be
scrapped .... 16
The Board of Law Examiners replied:
The Committee cites an article by Deborah Rhode as authority for this
proposition. While Ms. Rhode's article has been quoted before by those
who seek to curtail pre-admission investigations, the trend nationally is for
admission authorities to inquire more closely regarding past character and
fitness problems, and to devote more resources to background investiga-
tions.
The Board is currently studying the records of a small sample of
applicants who, subsequent to admission, were disciplined for professional
misconduct. The study appears to indicate that those applicants who
disclosed character and fitness problems upon application for admission are
more likely than other applicants to engage in conduct which later results
in professional discipline. However, regardless of the final outcome of this
study, common sense and practical experience suggest that one does not
need a statistically validated study to conclude that an applicant with a
track record of fraudulent conduct is more likely to engage in fraudulent
practices as an attorney.' 7
14. Id. at 516.
15. Id. at 555 (noting that 14% believed the process was ineffective, 25% were unsure, and slightly
over 50% found the process effective).
16. Bar Application Comm., Minn. State Bar Ass'n, Bar Application Committee Report and
Recommendation 5, May 1991 (revised Nov. 1991) (copy on file with author) (citing Rhode, supra note
10).
17. Letter from Margaret Fuller Comielle, Director, Minnesota Board of Law Examiners, to Robert
J. Monson, President, Minnesota State Bar Association 8 (Sept. 3, 1991) (copy on file with author)
(presenting the Board of Law Examiner's response to the Bar Application Committee's report (Bar
Application Comm., supra note 16)).
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The exchange in Minnesota is unusual because it has been formalized in an
exchange of official letters. The underlying dialogue, however, is not unusual.
Substantial and respectable voices within states, often among the officials
charged with enforcement responsibility, question the value of any character
screening. The reply of the traditionalists is not, "Oh no, you're off base," but
rather, "Well, maybe, but we're carrying on." In this context, one would
expect to find some states abandoning the inquiry, others appointing
committees to modify it, some states introducing new and stricter in-your-face
rules, and so on. It is the absence of any strong reaction that is at least
curious and, I believe, telling.
There are three possible straightforward and instrumentalist explanations for
the persistence of the character and fitness inquiry. (1) Inertia, pure and
simple. (2) Deterrence: perhaps the inquiry is prized, not for keeping people
out at the moment of admission, but rather for keeping them from even
thinking about careers in law. (3) Redirection: perhaps the name of the inquiry
is the same but the substance of what is done has changed in response to the
cumulation of criticism. Although I cannot completely discount any of these
explanations, they are not alone convincing explanations for the persistence
of the requirement.
A. Inertia
No doubt it is a mistake to underestimate the force of doing nothing. It may
be that criticism of the character and fitness standard is working its way
slowly through the system and I am wrong to assume that change is not
underway-it is simply moving slowly. There are two reasons to reject this
explanation.
First, consider comparable questions in the licensing of physicians.
Traditionally, doctors were screened for "moral character" in the same way
as lawyers. But this standard has been changing fairly rapidly in recent years.
Rhode, for example, conducted her most detailed research with respect to
fourteen states. In two of those states, the licensing requirement of good
moral character has been eliminated from the medical licensing statutes in the
last ten years.' 8 Pointedly, one of those states is Minnesota. In 1985, the
requirement of "good moral character" for doctors was replaced with the far
18. Maine deleted "good moral character" from the medical licensing statute in 1983. ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 3271 (West Supp. 1991). Minnesota did the same in 1985. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 147.02 (West 1989).
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more specific standard: "[Have not] engaged in conduct warranting disciplin-
ary action against a licensee."' 9 If inertia explained continuing the status quo
for lawyers, why would medical licensing be different? Surely the medical
authorities could have said about physicians what the bar authorities said
about lawyers: "[O]ne does not need a statistically validated study to conclude
that an applicant with a track record of ... [irresponsible] conduct is more
likely to engage in ... [irresponsible] practices as ... [a physician]. '""0
Second, although many legal institutions are slow to change, professional
regulation of lawyers is not among them. The last decade has seen enormous
changes in advertising, solicitation, geographic restriction, billing practices,
law firm organization, and the like. Of course, some of these changes have
been produced by external forces. But the self-regulatory mechanisms have
also produced rapid change. The introduction and widespread use of the
multistate bar examination has substantially changed one part of the admission
process and, as Richard Abel has observed about rapid change in the
governing professional recommendations, "[c]omplete revisions of the ABA
rules were proposed or adopted in 1928, 1933, 1937, 1954, 1969, and
1982. "2I
B. Deterrence
A second possibility is that the real point of the character and fitness
requirement is that it deters some definable subset of people from even
beginning the study of law. Taken this way, the paucity of applicants actually
screened out by the admitting authorities is proof that the requirement is
efficacious-scoundrels, radicals, and the like do not waste their time in law
school because they realize that the investment would be wasted and instead
they use the capital to fund a political campaign or a graduate degree in
business. This seems unlikely, although hard to refute by any specific
evidence. There are many uses for a law degree not requiring bar admis-
sion-teaching and careers in business, for example. An "undesirable" would
then still have some incentive to invest in law school, and little reason not to
spend the minimum of effort to see if bar admission is possible. In many
states, it is possible for a student to apply for preliminary character and
fitness screening once she has been accepted in an accredited law school. This
possibility, rarely used, would surely be a common practice if there were a
19. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 147.02(I)(g).
20. See supra note 18.
21. RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 141 (1989).
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substantial population of would-be bar members unwilling to risk the three-
year investment in legal education.
It might be argued that people who think about legal careers at some
formative psychological moment abandon their hopes, perhaps even uncon-
sciously, because they realize that lawyers have high standards of moral
character but that they themselves have such moral deficiencies that an
alternative career, perhaps as a drug dealer or a physician in Minnesota,
would be more appropriate. The argument, in other words, is that the actual
operation of character and fitness standards is irrelevant-what matters is the
public perception. One could imagine such a mental process in the dream
world of the American Bar Association seventy-five years ago, but not in our
culture, not in a generation of L.A. Law watchers.22
C. Redirection
Another possible explanation for the persistence of the character and fitness
inquiry is that the criticisms, while seeming to roll off the backs of the
affected agencies, have in fact been taken silently to heart. Consider
Minnesota again. When that state's bar association criticized the requirement
because of its lack of empirical foundation, the law examiners responded with
a factual study recommended by an ABA committee twenty years earlier.2"
In the study, the investigators reviewed the files of fifty-two lawyers
disciplined in Minnesota after admission to practice.24 The Minnesota
admitting authority has a particularly well-developed set of criteria for ranking
admissions applications to determine whether they present an issue requiring
further screening for character and fitness-for example, nonpayment of child
support or conviction of a felony or misdemeanor.25 Using these criteria, the
investigators retrospectively classified the fifty-two files: they found that
twenty-six of them met the standards that would currently trigger close
scrutiny. This fifty percent of disciplined applicants who met the closer
scrutiny criteria should be compared with the twenty percent of all applicants
who meet these criteria. By any reasonable measure, the difference in these
numbers is statistically significant. Of course, this study has a number of
methodological problems. All of us who work with state supreme courts
22. There are many riches in Robert E. Rosen, Ethical Soap: L.A. Law and the Privileging of
Character, 43 U. MIAMI L. RV. 1229 (1989).
23. See Alan Dershowitz, Preventive Disbarment: The Numbers Are Against It, 58 A.B.A. J. 815
(1972).
24. Carl Baer & Peg Corneille, Character and Fitness Inquiry from Bar Admission to Professional
Discipline, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 1992, at 5, 6.
25. See id. apps. A, C.
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recognize the difficulties of access to sensitive and confidential information
like this. A very serious problem with the Minnesota study is the necessity of
doing the classification retrospectively, compounded by the destruction of
records more than ten years old. Some of the criteria for classification are so
subjective-for example, a "recent and serious employment termination" 26-
that retrospective classification raises very serious problems of objectivity. In
addition, for purposes of the observation I am about to make, the small
sample size is a problem. The sample is large enough to make a statistically
significant judgment about the gross relationship between all criteria of
admission and all kinds of professional discipline. But the samples are not
large enough to produce statistically significant answers to more focused
questions-for example, is a plagiarizing law student likely to be professional-
ly negligent?
I think we can, however, learn one important thing from the Minnesota
study: if the methodological problems can be resolved, it would be possible
to predict lawyer misconduct more effectively than is often supposed by
academic critics. To explain why I think that point is important, I need to
outline the theoretical bases of the academic critique of character and fitness
inquiry.27 There are two fundamental objections. One is that prediction of
behavior is far more difficult than common sense supposes; the retrospective
correlations drawn by casual observation, usually called common sense, are
seldom verifiable under controlled circumstances. The second is that "moral
character" is not a unitary phenomenon. One who fails to file tax returns is
no more or less likely to abuse children than another who makes large
charitable contributions. Since ethical behavior is so heavily influenced by
context, extrapolating from, say, hardball driving behavior to hardball
litigating behavior is not only statistically difficult but theoretically wrong-
headed.
This theoretical academic critique is most powerful when directed to the
"character" part of character and fitness. At its beginning, the exclusionary
function of the screening requirement seems to have been aimed at "character"
rather than fitness. Even the Indiana Constitution of 1851,8 which protected
the right of all "voters" (males, of course, in 1851) to practice law, was
limited to voters "of good moral character." The idea of "fitness," however,
evokes a different set of concerns-concerns that we might today articulate
26. See id. at 6.
27. All definitively reviewed in Rhode, supra note 10.
28. IND. CONST. OF 1851, art. 2, § 2 (amended 1881, 1921, 1976, 1984).
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in the language of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual.2 9 We could say
that an untreated alcoholic who went bankrupt, got divorced, and has a felony
arrest record, is a bad risk for his clients-without making any judgment
about his character.
The Minnesota study, in other words, by aggregating "character" (which
may have no correlation with attorney behavior) with "fitness" (which may
have a solid relationship with attorney behavior), may still be consistent with
the generally accepted psychological principle that "character" itself is not a
fixed and unitary phenomonon. In fact, courts and lawyers have always done
something very odd with the relationship between character and fitness.
Typical, even of an earlier generation of cases, is Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners in 1957.30 Schware was exactly the sort of person the character
requirement was meant to keep out of the New Mexico bar-a Jew and an ex-
communist. In the course of discussing the constitutionality of the "character"
requirement (and of finding a violation of due process), Justice Black wrote
this for the court: "A State can require high standards of qualification, such
as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant
to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the
applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law."'31 Read closely, this passage
seems to require that fitness is the constitutional standard. Although this
passage has been often, very often, quoted in upholding the character
requirement, it has rarely been read closely.
III. THE PURPOSE OF REGULATION
Almost every problem in the regulation of the legal profession is subject to
conflicting analyses. Controlling admission to the bar, for example, is seen by
one group as the manipulation of supply to maximize the income of already
entrenched practitioners. Others will argue the need to protect the public from
unqualified or unscrupulous practitioners whose skill the lay person will be
unable to evaluate (or, to put it more precisely, information costs in a free
market will be too high and incompletely internalized). Restrictions on
solicitation are either barriers to entry for new firms or respect for the
autonomy of clients at times of distress. And so on.
There is a central problem with the economic analysis of the rules
regulating lawyers. Lawyers as a group lack the commonality of interest
29. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS,
(3d ed. rev. 1987)
30. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
31. Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
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which might characterize many entrepreneurs. 2 Consider, for example, the
admission of new lawyers. A solo practitioner probably dreads new competi-
tion in the market for his limited diet of court appointments, wills; and the
like. Other, "elite" segments of the profession profit from new lawyers--
professors, for example, or senior partners who pay wages for new associates
and therefore favor an ample supply of available labor. It would be hard to
predict which segment of the profession would have the most influence with
the admitting authorities. The same problem exists with unauthorized practice,
for example. Wall Street and K Street firms hardly make their money because
of their licenses; much of what they do is done, for fees in the same range,
by investment bankers and lobbyists. Indeed, the most powerful District of
Columbia firms were some of the strongest proponents of partnership with
nonlawyers. Such firms do not represent the same economic interest as the
solo practitioner threatened by the licensed independent paralegal.
On most points of collective action, then, the legal profession is unable to
act in its common interest because its interest is not common. The one point
of common interest is the creation of an effective system by which lawyers
can assure clients that they are bound to them. These are legal duties
analogous to what I have called "fitness" in the preceding section. These are
the duties to keep confidences, to segregate trust funds, and to file suits
before the statute of limitations runs. The reader of the Model Rules will note
that these duties are clearly specified in straightforward sections of the code.
The legal system has created effective remedies for these violations. One of
the most frequent criticisms of the professional discipline system is that it
responds mainly to client complaints and almost never acts without a specific
complaint from an injured client.33
Viewed as a problem of collective action, what if the regulation of lawyers
stopped here, eliminating the inquiry into "character"? There would be no
plausible claim that lawyers should control the system of discipline (at least,
any more than they control all systems of discipline through the needs of
staffing enforcement agencies and judicial review). Regulation of lawyers
would resemble the licensing of plumbers. It would be accomplished by
guidelines enacted by the legislature and enforced through an ordinary agency
process, instead of through judicial guidelines often beyond the constitutional
reach of either the executive or legislative branch. No doubt the regulatory
agencies could be partly captured, but it would be hard to achieve the
32. See generally Richard L. Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, 1981 Wis. L. REv.
1117.
33. For a sophisticated discussion, see David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lmvyers?, 105
HARv. L. REV. 799, 822-24 (1992).
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permanent and irrevocable custody which exists under the current system.
Perhaps it is no accident that, in Indiana for example, plumbers are specifical-
ly forbidden by the legislature to have sex while on a housecall 3 4-while in
California, the courts, bar, and legislature have spent four years trying to
figure out who has jurisdiction over lawyer-client sex.35
What is needed to complete the project of regulatory capture is the claim
to act in the. public interest. The reader of the Model Rules will note
obligations to treat opposing parties fairly, to reform the legal system, to be
truthful and open, to perform pro bono legal service, and so on. The careful
reader will also note, however, that these duties are usually phrased as duties,
but only in aspirational language (A lawyer should render public interest legal
service 36) or language of compelling vagueness (A lawyer shall report
another lawyer if there is a substantial question about the other's ethics37).
I have never found a case of a lawyer disbarred for not performing pro bono
service. In most states, however, a lawyer who steals from a client will be
gone almost automatically. Yet it appears as though the enforcement apparatus
applies equally to both situations. Thus the coercive force of the state both
subsidizes the public relations process and allows the profession to corral the
free riders who might not otherwise be willing to support the expense of
maintaining generalized client confidence.
While th6 enforcement mechanisms may not apply with equal force to the
protection of consumers and to the promotion of the public interest, lawyers
have defined themselves-their characters, anyway, if not their very
selves-in such a way that they feel dissatisfied with, even repelled by, their
professional lives if they fall too far short of this standard. This point is
obviously controversial and one for which I have too little evidence and
perhaps too much hope. Recognizing that regulation's main effect is the
construction of character does, however, enable us to discuss what lawyers
should be like by asking not, "Will we know it when we see it?," but, "How
do we create it?" If we have created our profession rather than regulated it,
we have to take a rather different order of responsibility for it.
34. IND. CODE 25-28.5-1-27.1-(b)(5) (1988).
35. See Court Adopts Sex Rules for California Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 31, 1992, at 6.
36. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble (1992).
37. Id. Rule 8.3.
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